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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 252, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION 
OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
-2-14M1— of—the^G-iv-M—Seqrvice—Law^—" - — 
//1A-8/6/81 
BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
Case No. D-0189 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & SIEGEL (AMY GLADSTEIN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN L. BARR, ESQ. (ANTHONY CAGLIOSTRO, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on a charge filed by Counsel to the 
Public Employment Relations Board (Counsel) alleging that Local 
252, Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (TWUA) caused, 
instigated, encouraged, condoned and engaged in a strike against 
1 
the Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority (MSBA) for a consecutive 
nine-day work period covering January 2 through January 10, 1980. 
A hearing was held on the charge on July 2, October 28 and Decem-
ber 17, 1980, and the hearing officer recommended that the charge 
be dismissed on the ground that the conduct of TWUA and the unit 
employees did not constitute a strike within the meaning of §210.1 
of the Taylor Law. 
FACTS 
TWUA represents a unit of approximately 640 employees, of 
whom approximately 460 are bus drivers. While MSBA required a 
pre-trip inspection by bus drivers of their assigned buses, the 
1 MSBA operates 58 bus routes in Nassau County, some of which 
make connections in Suffolk and Queens Counties. 
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normal practice of the drivers was to drive buses which had 
! 
equipment defects that violated the State Vehicle and Traffic Law. 
They would not report these defects until the conclusion of the 
run, thus avoiding the removal of the buses from service for 
immediate repair. 
Sometime during November, 1979, TWUA entered into negotia-
tions w£th~MSBA^b~r^a—c^^ 
'• I 
terms and conditions of employment that were imposed by a legis-
lative determination of MSBA for the calendar year of 1979. 
During the course of the negotiations, Arnold, the president of 
TWUA, warned MSBA that there would be "big trouble" if the parties 
did not agree upon a collective bargaining contract by January 1, 
1980. He also informed the bus drivers that they were not requiredj 
to operate buses which had equipment defects that constituted 
! 
violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. However, the normal j 
i 
practice of operating such vehicles continued at that time. j 
The parties were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement by I 
' j 
the end of 1979 and from January 2 through January 10, 1980, 
drivers refused to drive buses that had equipment defects which 
violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. On January 8, 1980, MSBA 
2 
obtained a temporary injunction from Justice Altimari— ordering 
the bus drivers to drive the buses which had defects that violated 
• 
the Vehicle and Traffic Law, except for specified types of 
defects which he found to constitute "an imminent danger to person 
i 
or property". Arnold took the court decision to MSBA's depots ] 
\ 
2 Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority v. Transport Workers Union j 
of America, Local 252, AFL-CIO, Supreme Court, Nassau County, | 
(unreported). 
Board - D-0189 ~J 
and advised the drivers of its terms. The percentage of bus runs 
not operated on January 9 and 10 was 30%. This was significantly-
lower than the percentage of bus runs not operated during the 
other days of the alleged strike, except Sunday, January 6. 
The charge herein is limited to the disqualification by 
driver order ofTmses^for equipment defects whicliJustice :. ^ 
Altimari found not to constitute an imminent danger to person 
or property. The number of such disqualified buses was signif-
icantly less than the number of buses disqualified for eqipment 
defects which Justice Altimari found to constitute an imminent 
3 
danger to person or property. 
The hearing officer concluded that TWUA was responsible for 
the concerted refusal of the drivers to operate buses with 
equipment defects that violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. He 
ruled, however, that it was not a strike because a strike cannot 
consist of a refusal to perform work in the normal manner where 
the normal manner of performance involves a violation of law or 
controlling regulation even if the refusal is motivated by an 
interest in pressuring the employer in negotiations. 
DISCUSSION 
As indicated by their normal practice, both before and after 
the period of the job action, of driving buses which had equip-
The record evidence supports this conclustion but is not 
sufficient to permit a determination of the precise impact 
of the charged strike. 
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ment defects that violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the 
drivers' refusal to do so at that time did not involve any con-
cern on their part related to that law. This case, therefore, 
presents the question whether it is a strike if employees, for 
the sole purpose of securing job-related demands in collective 
negotiations, concertedly refuse to perform their duties in the 
'
 _ r^ma~2rniaiirrer~~wfren-thalr^ niyrtria±=1Ti[ahrre^ ^ 
laws. We determine that, insofar as it involves provisions of 
the Vehicle and Traffic Law that do not involve an imminent 
threat to person or property, such a refusal by bus drivers to 
perform their duties in the normal manner is a strike in viola-
4 
tion of the Taylor Law. We conclude that the Vehicle and 
Traffic Law provisions were merely a pretext for the concerted 
5 
refusal of the drivers to operate the buses. The justification 
of the drivers' conduct is not offered in good faith and must be 
rejected by us. Plans for the concerted refusal to drive defec-
tive buses were formulated more than a month before their imple-
mentation and the sole purpose of those plans was to secure col-
lective bargaining demands. Public employees' abnormal and overly 
meticulous adherence to law and rules which has' the effect of 
4 We note that the NLRB has indicated that a refusal to perform 
work prohibited by law might be improper even under the NLRA 
if based upon a malicious motive to frustrate the employer's 
business operations. Varied Enterprises, Inc., 240 NLRB No. 
12, 100 LRRM 1305 (1979). 
5_ We recognize that a refusal to perform a task because of a 
bona fide fear of personal injury does not constitute parti-
cipation in a strike. Van Vlack v. Ternullo, 74 AD2d 827, 13 
PERB 1f7515 (Second Dept., 1980) and Buffalo' Teachers Federa-
tion, 5 PERB 1f3025 (1972). 
9 v'feW 
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interfering with the performance of the mission of the employer 
and which is designed to extract collective bargaining conces-
sions from the employer, is a strike. Dowling v. Bowen, 53 AD2d 
6 
862, 9 PERB 117523 (Second Dept. , 1976). 
We conclude that TWUA engaged in a strike on January 2 
through January 8, 1980, when the drivers refused to operate 
buses which did not, according to Justice Altimari, constitute 
dangerous conditions even though some did violate the Vehicle and 
Traffic Law. We do not find a strike on January 9 and 10. There 
is no evidence that TWUA was responsible for any refusal of the 
drivers to operate the buses on those days for defects other than 
those for which Justice Altimari authorized the refusal. On the 
contrary, the record shows that Arnold brought the court order to 
the attention of the drivers and the percentage of bus runs not 
operated declined significantly. 
In assessing a penalty, we note that this is the second 
strike by TWUA. The earlier strike took place on January 3, 1975. 
On that day, too, because of a labor relations dispute, unit 
employees disqualified buses from service because of equipment 
6_ City policemen were held to have engaged in a strike when they 
disrupted the City's sanitation and transportation services by 
stopping City vehicles for Vehicle and Traffic law violations 
that did not impair the safe operation of the vehicles. This 
overly meticulous adherence to the law was a departure from 
the normal practice of the policemen. It reflected a dissatis-
faction with the progress of police negotiations and not a 
concern for the strict enforcement of the law. 
In the instant situation, Justice Altimari was also not impressed 
by TWUA's argument that the drivers' overly meticulous adherence 
to the Vehicle and Traffic Law shielded their refusal to per-
form their normal duties. He was only concerned with avoiding 
true danger to person and property. 
h \\ •' a jp * 
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7 
defects for which they were not normally disqualified. 
The minimum suspension of dues deduction privileges that 
this. Board has imposed upon an employee organization for a second 
violation of §210.1 of the Taylor Law.has been for an indefinite 
period, subject to restoration upon application after the suspen-
sion has been in effect at least one year. Given the limited 
'8 
.impact _ o f the _ _.str ike that, was char ged ~*_ an d. found to have o ccurr ed 
here,, we impose that minimum, penalty. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the deduction privileges for 
dues and agency shop fees, if any, of Local 252, 
Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, be sus-
pended indefinitely, commencing on the first practic-
able date, provided that it may apply to this Board at 
any time after the suspension has been in effect for 
one year, for the full restoration of such privileges. 
Such application shall be on notice to all interested 
parties and supported by proof of good faith compliance 
with subdivision one of Section 210 of the Civil 
Service Law since the violation herein found, such 
proof to include, for example, the successful negotia-
tion, without violation of said subdivision, of a 
contract covering the employees in the unit affected 
7 See TWUA 8 PERB 13096 (1975). In that case, however, a strike 
was found on the basis of the fact that some of the equipment 
defects for which buses were disqualified did not violate any j 
law. 
8 A more severe penalty would have been assessed had TWUA been 
found responsible for all the loss suffered by MSBA and all 
the inconvenience suffered by its riders. 
7tea 
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by the violation, and accompanied by an affirmation 
that it no longer asserts the right to strike against 
any government as required by the provisions of Civil 
Service Law §210.3(g). If it becomes necessary to 
utilize the dues deduction process for the purpose of 
paying the whole or any part of a fine imposed by order 
of a cour t, as . a p.en.a 11 y in a coh t emp t act ion, _ari s ing I 
DATED: 
out of the strike herein, the suspension of dues j 
I 
deduction privileges ordered hereby may be interrupted j 
or postponed for such period as shall be sufficient ) 
to comply with such order of the court, whereupon the 
suspension ordered hereby shall be resumed or initiated, 
as the case may be. 
Albany, New York 
August 6, 1981 
$tU. JfJ?*"^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
£M^5 
David C. Randies , Me: 
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Dissenting Opinion of Chairman Harold R. Newman 
I cannot agree with my colleagues that it is a strike if 
employees, for the purpose of securing job-related demands in 
collective negotiations, concertedly refuse to perform their I 
i 
- dut_-iajS^jLnizi3^nojrm ^ - - '-- { -
s t a t e law. 
The Taylor Law requires bus drivers employed by MSBA 
! 
to perform the tasks that are inherent in the jobs for which • 
they were hired. The Vehicle and Traffic Law requires the 
bus drivers to perform tasks that are enjoined upon them by 
law. To this extent, the two laws have a common purpose and 
must be deemed in pari materia. For the purpose of the [ 
instant case, they should be construed together as though \ 
1 
. forming part of a single statute. In doing so, I conclude 
that the Taylor Law forbids the bus drivers to abstain from 
the full performance of their normal duties only to the 
extent that such normal duties are not prohibited by the 
Vehicle and Traffic Law. My colleagues' failure to treat the j 
Taylor Law and the Vehicle and Traffic Law as being in pari 
materia leads to the mischievous result of compelling the bus [ 
1 McKinney's 'Statutes., §221.b. 
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drivers to perform work that is prohibited by law. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
August 6, 1981 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
2 In Purcell v. Wald, 14 PERB 1f7504 (1980), the Supreme Court 
for Nassau County dealt with a similar question when police 
demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the progress of 
contract negotiations by over-zealously enforcing the Vehicl 
and Traffic Law. The Court said: 
"Can it truly be said that the insistence by the police 
on strict compliance with the Vehicle and Traffic Law 
coupled with a directive of the president of the PBA 
to 'go strictly by the book' constitutes a work stoppage? 
Or, put another way, can the Court take judicial notice 
that the excessive enforcement intended to cause embar-
rassment to the County and its officials has caused 
more than inconvenience to the public and taxpayer and 
has risen to the level of a strike? I think not." 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 







COUNTY EMPLOYEES UNIT, ORANGE COUNTY 
LOCAL 836, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
JAMES G. SWEENEY, ESQ.
 ; (ALBERT P. PACIONE, JR., 
ESQ., of Counsel), fo;r Respondent 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS. (WILLIAM 
M. WALLENS, ESQ:, of Counsel), for charging 
Party. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) to a hearing officer's decision 
dismissing its charge that the County of Orange (County) committed 
an improper practice in that it excluded job titles from a certi-
fied negotiating unit. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts upon which the hearing officer relied for 
a decision were stipulated by the parties. CSEA had been origin-
ally certified in 1968 as the representative of a unit which in-
1/ 
eluded all county employees except for those in specified titles. 
1 PERB 11399.07 
7028 
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In certifying CSEA, this Board did not determine the appropriate-j 
ness of the unit. Its role was merely to ascertain whether the j 
employees in the unit, which was agreed upon by CSEA and the 
I 
County, wished to be represented by CSEA, Subsequently, in 1974, | 
the Service Employees International Union challenged CSEA's 
status as representative of the employees in the certified unit. 
Again this Board held an election in the agreed-upon unit, and 
" " " " " " ' "
 : :










 " " " '
r
 " • " ' " ' " " " " ' ' - • - - • - - • - '
 r 
it certified CSEA as the employee organization selected by the 
2 
unit employees. 
On May 29, 1980, a date on which a petition for decertifica-
tion would have been timely under our Rules, the County notified 
CSEA that it was recognizing CSEA as the representative of a unit| 
of employees that excluded certain employees who were in the 
existing unit. CSEA contends that this conduct of the County is 
improper. 
Following Board precedent, the hearing officer ruled that i 
the County had been free at that time- to withdraw the recognition 
of CSEA because this Board had not approved of the parties' 
original unit determination on its merits. CSEA does not argue, 
in support of its exceptions, that the hearing officer has misreac. 
the relevant Board decisions. Rather, it argues that the Board 
should reconsider and overrule those decisions on the ground that 
a contrary ruling would better serve the public policy underlying 
the Taylor Law of guaranteeing the right of public employees to 
be represented and to continue to be represented in appropriate 
units by the employee organization of their choice. 
2 7 PERB 113071.4, 
HH 
£ i S /Si* %_? 
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DISCUSSION 
In 1976, this Board issued a consolidated decision dismissing 
four charges that named public employers acted improperly by 
unilaterally altering a negotiating unit during the period when 
3 
a decertification petition could have been filed. This decision 
held that a public employer did not violate paragraphs (a) or (d) 
'dr^^"&^=a^l—b_f^h^^Ta^lVr''lswr"by uniiiTterafly" altering the nego- F 
tiating unit during the period when a decertification petition 
would have been timely. The reasons for this holding were that 
there was no evidence that the action was taken by the employers 
for the purpose of depriving public employees of protected rights, 
and that the employers did not violate their duty to negotiate j 
in good faith because the definition of a negotiating unit is not 
a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
3 Southern Cayuga CSD/'et al. , 9 PERB 1[3056 (1976), As the 
decision involved several public employers in different counties, 
it was separately appealed in two different courts, both of 
which confirmed' the decision of this Board. Skaneateles 
Teachers Association v. PERB, 9 PERB 1f7024 (Supreme Court, 
Onondaga County, 1976); Southern Cayuga Teachers Association v. 
PERB, 10 PERB 1f7008 (Supreme Court, Montgomery County, 1977), 
aTfTrmed 59 AD2d 1032, 10 PERB 1(7017 (4th Dept,, 1977). This 
decision was based upon the reasoning in prior decisions of | 
this Board. See: ' City of White Plains, 3 PERB 1(3086 (1970), 
confirmed by the Supreme Court, CSEA v. PERB, 65 Misc.2d 544, 
4 PERB 1(7000 (Albany County, 1971), affirmed on other grounds, 
39 AD2d 971, 5 PERB 1(7013 (3rd Dept., 1972); County of 
Jefferson, 4 PERB 1(3057 (1971) . It has also been cited with 
approval by this Board in several decisions for reasons not 
relevant to the issue before us. See: ' Addison Central School 
District, 13 PERB 1(3060 (1980); County of Orange, 14 PERB 
KSOlXTTSSl); and Hudson Falls, 14 PERB 1(3021 (1981), 
! 
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In the above-cited 1976 consolidated cases, this Board gave 
controlling weight to the statutory power of public employers, as 
specified in §204 and §207 of the Taylor Law, to recognize 
I 
employee organizations and to define the appropriate employer-
4 
employee negotiating unit, subject to the statutory standards. 
It reasoned that the statutory power of an employer unilaterally 1 
to define a unit for purposes of voluntary recognition of an 
employee organization included the power later to redefine the 
unit at such time as the representation rights could be challenged. 
In permitting the public employer to alter an agreed-upon nego-
tiating unit during the period when a decertification petition 
• 
would have been timely, this Board concluded that the impact upon 
the rights of public employees would be de minimis. While a dis-
satisfied employee organization could, if it wished, file a rep-
resentation petition to question the employer's action, the 
relative ease by which a public employer could alter agreed-upon 
negotiating units would, we believed, generally encourage such j 
• 
agreements and discourage the litigation of representation issues J 
In its brief and oral argument•in the instant case, CSEA now 
urges us to overrule the prior decisions and to declare it 
improper for a public employer to alter unilaterally an agreed-
upon negotiating unit. It argues that such unilateral action 
interferes with the organizational and representational rights of 
public employees. 
Further assessment of the policy implications of past de- j 
j 
cisions in.light of evolving labor relations experience has led j 
this Board to reconsider the wisdom of its position. We now con- j 
' . j 
4 See CSEA v. Helsby, 21 NY2d 541, 1 PERB 1702 (1968). [ 
i 
\ 
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elude that the consequences for public employees of a unilateral I 
alteration of agreed-upon negotiating units are more substantial i 
than we had previously thought. 
The employees' rights of organization and representation 
specified in §202 and §203 of the Taylor Law are at the heart of 
the statute. Indeed, §200 of the Taylor Law, which states the 
public policy underlying the law, indicates that they are the 
first means of effectuating that public policy. In contrast, the 
public employer's power to recognize unions and to define nego-
tiating units is merely a procedural convenience. The action of 
a public employer in unilaterally altering a negotiating unit by 
contracting its scope will, inevitably, weaken the employee j 
organization's ability to represent and negotiate for the employee^ 
excluded by the employer and for those remaining in the contracted 
unit. The exclusion of some employees from.a negotiating unit 
enables the employer unilaterally to change at will and with 
impunity the terms and conditions of employment of those employees 
The Employees and their representative are deprived of ,the right 
both to negotiate the change, and to file a grievance about it. 
Similarly, they are without recourse to the improper practice pro 
cedures of this Board. The employees in the redefined unit are 
likely hurt by the contraction of their unit because their organi 
zation's ability to negotiate on their behalf may well be impaired! 
Moreover, the inability of the employee organization to prevent i 
the employer's unilateral action would tend to shake the employees'! 
] 
confidence in their organization and can affect their choice of 1 
representative. j 
I 
We confront, moreover, a question of policy in the adminis- I 
1 
tration of this statute. Considerations of fairness and reason- j 
I ableness should preclude a public employer which has agreed to a 
J. 
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negotiating unit and which has dealt with an employee organization 
on the basis of that unit from changing the unit unilaterally. It 
is.reasonable that the burden of petitioning this Board for a 
definition of the appropriate unit should be borne by the party 
seeking to change an existing unit and not by the party that is J 
content to abide by the status quo. While the employer might be 
I 
slightly inconvenienced by having to file the petition, it would 
- - - not be -prejudiced thereby._,-__
 r _: ..,. .—:..._,-_, ..-. ... _ _ . 
Accordingly, we overrule the holding of Southern Cayuga CSD 
that a public employer may determine unilaterally, at a time when 
• 
decertification would be timely, that a unit created by agreement 
• 5 
is no longer appropriate. 
We now determine that the County violated §209-a.l(a) of the 
Taylor Law by unilaterally altering the negotiating unit repre-
sented by CSEA. We direct the County to rescind its action of 
May 29, 1980, excluding certain employees from CSEA's negotiating 
• 
unit, and we further direct it to cease and desist from refusing 
to negotiate the terms and conditions of such employees with CSEA.i 
This relief is necessary to protect the statutory rights of 
the employees whom the County removed from the unit. On 
-
the other hand, we extend the time for the County to file a 
5 In doing so, we note that we are not bound by the earlier 
decisions. A labor relations agency may reappraise its prior 
decisions and overrule them when new insights gained from 
practical experience with past principles change its under-
standing of how to protect the statutory rights of employees. 
See: NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). We 
did so in Cheektowaga-Maryvale Educators Association, 11 PERB 
1f3080 (1978) , affirmed Maryvale Educators Association v. 
Newman, 70 AD2d 758,. 12 PERB 117018 (1979). This conclusion | 
is not affected by the fact that the prior decisions have been 
affirmed in court. The court decisions have not held that the 
prior Board interpretations were the only possible correct 
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decertification petition concerning such unit until the expira-
tion of 30 days following its receipt of this decision. It is 
appropriate that the County's time to file a petition be so 
extended because its decision not to file a petition during the 
normal period was taken in reliance upon decisions of this Board. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the County of Orange to: 
1. Rescind its action of May 29, 1980,jexcluding 
certain employees from CSEA 's negotiating 
unit; arid 
Cease and desist from refusing to negotiate 
the terms and conditions of such employees 
with CSEA in the unit as it existed prior to 
May 29, 1980, unless and until said unit is 
changed in an appropriate proceeding initiated 
by the employer within 30 days from the date 
hereof, as indicated in this decision. 
DATED; Albany, New York 
August 6, 1981 
< ^ S * y / f c ^ f e g f e s f c ^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
ahs^. 
David C. R a n d i e s , MerarDer 
5. (continued) 
"PERB's interpretation is legally permissible and does not 
breach constitutional rights arid protections." Southern 
Cayuga Teachers Association v. PERB, 10 PERB If7008, at p. 7016, 
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Dissenting Opinion of Chairman Harold R. Newman 
I agree with my colleagues that the rule of Southern Cayuga 
School District, 9 PERB 1[3056 (1976), is unwise and that a public 
i 
employer should not be permitted to alter an agreed-upon negoti- j 
ating unit unilaterally even at a time when it could have filed | 
a decertification petition. I also agree with my colleagues j 
that this Board is not legally bound by the principle of stare i 
decisis and may, therefore, depart from the precedent of its 
prior decision. However, I do not believe that this Board should 
do so in the instant case and adjudge the County of Orange in 
violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law, since the County 
relied upon the earlier decisions of this Board and the court. 
I would dismiss the charge herein, while simultaneously 
announcing to the clientele of this agency that the rule of 
Southern Cayuga School District would not be applied in the 
future and that public employers may no longer alter negotiating 
units unilaterally. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
August 6, 1981 
^—?-*•—* ^—*-&\ *& — -
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
• 
• 
• 
